EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
.
This study assessed the impact of aging on the performance and reliability of active fire protection systems (FPSs), including both fmed fire suppression and fixed fire detection systems. From the review of the data, it is clear that most FPS failures are discovered during testing and maintenance activities and not when the FPS is required to actuate. Most of the aging-related failures came from FPS pumps, smoke detectors, and fire doors. The FPS pumps failed for a number of different reasons, including battery and shaft seal failure. The smoke detector failures were a result of both aging and increased sensitivity from an accumulation of dust and dirt. The fire doors that failed were mostly in a high-traffic area.
The reliability of FPSs was also examined for both nuclear and non-nuclear applications.
Historically, water-based systems at nuclear power plants are generally assumed to have a 96% reliability as in, for example, the NUREG-1 150 and NUREGKR-4840 studies. This compares with Department of Energy (DOE) experience of 98.3%. None of these studies attempted to identify the contribution of aging to the probability of failure. The experience documented by DOE should closely mirror that of nuclear power plants, given the similarity of requirements for testing and maintaining FPSs. However, the experience base for nuclear power plants is not as comprehensive or as well studied as the DOE experience. In addition, an Electric Power
Research Institute (EPRI) report (NSAC-179L) presents fire suppression system reliability values which are utilized in EPRI's fire methodology plant screening guide, FIVE (Fire-Induced Vulnerability Evaluation), and which are very similar to the NUREGKR-4840 values. Given that the non-nuclear industry's testing and maintenance programs are generally less comprehensive than those of the nuclear power industry, one could assume that the reliability for the nuclear industry should be at least comparable ( 95% reported by National Fire Protection Association assumption is dependent on the attention and importance given to testing and maintenance at individual nuclear power plants. The lack of FPS failure data and a comprehensive study of FPS reliability at nuclear power plants makes it difficult to make a direct comparison with the nonnuclear industry.
The discovery or occurrence of most of the significant FPS failures during testing and maintenance activities and not on demand demonstrates the existence of an aggressive testing and maintenance program at most nuclear power plants. However, it is assumed that a more aggressive testing and maintenance program involving preventive diagnostics might flag agerelated FPS problems before they are found either during testing and maintenance or on demand.
In closing, although there has not been a quantitative estimate of the risk due to age-related FPS failures, it is clear from the data on both FPS failure and reliability that the risk impact is low.
Further, current fire risk assessment practices generally include sufficient margin in system reliability estimates to take into account the age-related failures which have been observed.
Adding predictive diagnostics to the maintenance program could reduce this already low risk even further.
INTRODUCTION
This study involved assessing the impact of aging on the performance and reliability of active fire protection systems (FPSs), including both fixed fire suppression and fixed fire detection systems.
As part of this study, both nuclear and non-nuclear industry data were investigated. analyzing the fire vulnerability of nuclear power plants. The EPRI report provides a database on FPS reliability, including data from nuclear and non-nuclear sources, and a spectrum of FPS ages.
Some of the sources of data include FMRC, EPRI, the U.S. Navy, and others. Reliability is described by type of FPS @e., Halon, COz, wet pipe, etc.). The EPRI report was obtained and reviewed, and the results are included in Section 3.2.
NUCLEAR INDUSTRY DATA
To estimate the frequency of fire protection system failures which could be attributed to aging, 
LERs Related to Failure to Perform or Maintain a Fire Watch
Based on the significant number of LERs related to the failure to perform or maintain a fire watch, it was decided to briefly mention this widespread and recurring problem. Upon review of the 2 167 LERs, it was apparent a that number of the utilities do not understand the fire protection requirements with respect to the plant technical specifications and the limiting conditions for operation. As a result, a large percentage of the LERs reviewed were associated with a failure to perform or establish an appropriate fire watch. These events occurred when an FPS in a given area was found to be inoperable or intentionally made inoperable for activities such as maintenance, or when inadequate fire barriers(i.e., doors) or seals were discovered. For most of these events, the failure to establish a fire watch was not due to an age-related failure of a FPS.
In these events, a continuous or periodic fire watch must be implemented; however, on numerous occasions the fire watches were not established or the fiequency of the fire watch was inadequate .
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or not maintained. Most of the LERs could be attributed to a lack of understanding of the limiting conditions for operation in the event of the degradation of a fire protectioddetection system. 
Events Related to Inadequacy of Fire Barriers
An additional type of FPS failure found in significant numbers in the LERs which for the most part was not applicable to aging is the failure or inadequacy of fire bamers. Most of these events were found during routine plant walkdowns or during scheduled fire barrier inspections. The largest source of reporting was from construction or modification activities during which fire barriers were improperly sealed during installation or resealed following maintenance activity.
There were a few barrier failure events which were attributed to aging; these are discussed in the following sections.
Smoke Detector-Related Events
There were a significant number of age-related events (22) in which smoke detectors went off and could not be reset because of increased sensitivity, dust/dirt accumulation or high humidity.
However, of the events where there was a malhnction caused by dirt or dust, it is not clear if all of them can be attributed to aging. Some of the events occurred after activity in the area which increased airborne dust. The events which could be attributed to aging involved the increased sensitivity of the detector. These events were consistently described as related to aging phenomenon. The events related to high humidity are difficult to avoid unless the type of detector is changed or if the event was due to unusual circumstances. The events related to dirt /dust accumulation are almost unavoidable in high traffic areas. If it is important to avoid spurious actuations of smoke detectors, an aggressive program (especially in high-traffic areas) to periodically clean and check the detectors must be implemented on a frequency based on plant experience with such actuations. Current maintenance activities may not be frequent enough for high-traffic areas or areas with a potential for high airborne diddust accumulation. This may be an area where performance-based inspections could reduce the number of failures.
/
There were a few additional events related to the failure of a fire-indicating unit which controlled the alardtrip fbnctions of the smoke detectors; in these cases the failure could be attributed to aging of the component. There was one event in which 6 of 10 smoke detectors in one fire zone failed due to corrosion from an unknown source.
FPS Electric and Diesel Pumps
In the review of the LERs, it was found that the majority of age-related failures of a FPS came from failures of the diesel or electric fire pump (37 events). However, only one of these failures could be classified as failure on demand during the required actuation of a FPS; the rest (36) were failure on demand during periodic testing or when the running pump was switched to perform maintenance. There were 7 events in which the starting batteries failed as a result of age or frequent testing and the diesel fire pump did not start on demand. The remaining 30 events were due to various age-related failures, including the following: . %
Fire Barrier or Fire Seal Failure
While many events associated with failure of fire barrier systems were identified, only a very small number of these events (7) appear to be age-related. Three of these involved the failure of fire barriers or door seals due to age-related phenomena. In addition, two of these three events involved potential deficiencies from construction activities, and the third (door seal failure) had management deficiencies as a contributing factor. One of the seven events involved a design deficiency in the control room door seals. In the remaining three events, a fire damper failed to close. In two of these events the fire damper was stuck because there was debris in the track. No root cause was found for the damper that failed to close upon actuation of the Halon FPS.
F'ireDoors
Eighteen LERs involved fire door problems that may have been related to age. Two of the events involved degraded seals on the control room doors and in the remaining sixteen a fire door failed because of aging or high use (i.e., worn hinges, latch). The failure of a fire door may be a violation of a Technical Specifications requirement, depending on the configuration of the fire zone being protected (FPS present, equipment in the area). Such failures may also provide a path for the spread of fire or fire products (smoke and heat) beyond a single fire area. This situation also requires a fire watch until the door is repaired. An aggressive program to track all the fire doors at a plant site and their inspection would be necessary to prevent such problems. However, -it is equally important, and potentially more cost effective, to stress to plant personnel the importance of fire doors and the need for prompt notification of any deficiency.
FPS Piping and Nozzles r
Fourteen events involved the failure or partial failure of a water-based FPS system because rust and scale buildup caused a blockage or because the piping wall was corroded. In one event, the entire FPS water main was lost because two carbon steel tension tie bolts were corroded. One of the fourteen events involved a pinhole leak in a 3-inch fire protection line caused by corrosion that pitted the wall. In twelve of the fourteen events, the FPS nozzles were plugged by rust and scale.
A more aggressive maintenance program to flush out the FPS lines might have prevented the plugging of the nozzles. However, if only the end nozzle in the line is opened as required by current procedures, debris may be lodged in the nozzles upstream of the opened nozzle. It is important to note that the plugging of the nozzles did not in any case involve 100% blockage; therefore partial FPS coverage was available.
Miscellaneous FPS Aging Failures
The FPS failures that fall into this category cover all age-related failures not discussed in the previous sections. The first event involved a fire in a cooling tower. The fire was extinguished by plant personnel, with extensive damage to the tower. The sprinkler system deluge valve was not effective in extinguishing the fire. The exact failure mode is unknown.
The second event involved the failure of a panel alarm buzzer relay in a fire detection instrumentation panel, causing a fire. The panel was de-energized and fire detectors in the switchgear rooms, battery room, diesel generator area, and diesel fuel storage area were rendered inoperable.
The third event involved the overheating and failure of a fire pump engine and its failure to trip.
The root cause for this event was a broken fan belt. The fifth event involved the failure of a deluge valve in the diesel generator area, which was attributed to rough mating surfaces between the valve latch and the clapper.
Summary
The experience indicates that the most common failures encountered are the failure of the FPS pumping source (diesel or electric pump). Most of these failures were aging-related and in most cases a redundant pumping source was available. This type of event is reportable because of the loss of redundancy in FPS pumping capabilities. Although periodic testing and maintenance usually identify FPS pump failures, only through trending and preventive diagnostics can FPS pumping-related failures be predicted and effectively eliminated. The second most common failure encountered was the spurious actuation or failure of smoke detectors to reset because of either aging and increased sensitivity, or an accumulation of dirt and dust. The third most common failure was fire door failure caused by aging or high use and traffic. Although this type of failure requires the spread of smoke or fire to an adjacent fire zone to be significant, it is a technical specification violation and requires a fire watch until it is corrected. For both the detector and fire door failures, an aggressive maintenance program tracking these types of failures and implementing preventive or corrective measures should ensure that there is limited recurrence or none. The following section uses this experience base and other FPS experience to characterize FPS reliability for both nuclear and non-nuclear applications.
RELIABILITY OF FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM
This section presents a summary of FPS reliability from four different sources (nuclear power plant, NFPA non-nuclear, DOE, and Australia-New Zealand experience). Although some of the reliability data are not directly applicable to nuclear power plant FPS installations, insights can be gained from the experience of other industries and government agencies. Specifically, the work most applicable to nuclear power plant experience is the DOE reliability study, which provides data that are directly comparable to nuclear power plant performance when considering the level of inspection, testing, and maintenance that both DOE and NRC require. The first study presented is that for nuclear power plants and is based on data from the United States and abroad.
The NFPA general industry data are presented next, followed by the DOE and Australian-New Zealand data.
Nuclear Power Plant FPS Reliability
In reference 6, failure rates (on demand) for three types of fire system (water deluge, COZ and Halon) are presented which were based on a literature review (Refs. 7 -10). Table 2 lists the failure probabilities given a demand for the three system types. Based on this literature search, best-estimate values for system reliability for water, Halon and COZ were taken to be 96%, 94%, and 96% respectively.
It is assumed that the FPS failure rates were based upon data in the referenced sources, which include nuclear power plants of various ages. Inherently this includes data from FPS with a spectrum of ages and therefore includes to some degree the effect of FPS aging. Without a detailed look at the data used to estimate these failure rates in conjunction with plant specific testing and maintenance programs, it would be difficult to assess the contribution of aging to the failure rates in Table 2 . and 2) to provide a better understanding of the reasons for conflicting reliability estimates that have been used in past FRAs." Section 1 of NSAC-179L provides an introduction and summary of automatic and manual suppression reliability data, including guidance on the selection and use of fire protection system reliability estimates in FRAs. Although FPS aging is not explicitly discussed, the contribution of aging is inherent in any set of reliability data. In general, the NSAC-179L and the current SNL review provide very similar overall system reliability point estimates. This is not overly surprising in that both studies have identified similar, and often identical, data sources. Another point of . similarity between the reviews is that both studies highlight aggressive maintenance and testing programs as the most effective means of ensuring high reliability in fire protection systems. Table 2 . Although different assumptions were used to determine the reliability of fire suppression systems, the NSAC-179L automatic FPS reliability point estimates, which are used in FIVE, are very similar to the T\suREG/CR-4840 values. However, as noted in NSAC-I 79L, there are two significant differences in the reliability data between NUREGKR-4840 and FIVE. In FIVE, the design of the automatic detection system is explicitly evaluated. This results in an additional event in the fire event tree that explicitly considers failure ofthe automatic detection system. In NUREG/CR-4840, detection and suppression are lumped as one event. Second, FIVE divides the water-based systems into two categories: wet pipe systems and deluge or preaction systems. This is done to account for the quality of the available data and the more reliable design of the wet-pipe system. NSAC-179L also contains a discussion of automatic suppression system reliability for COz, Halon, and water-based systems (wet-pipe, deluge, and preaction systems). As stated in Section 3 ofNSAC-l79L, "This study focused on providing data for systems failing to actuate or operate."
For each system type, data sources for automatic suppression system reliability, including the Department of Energy, Australia/New Zealand, high-rise buildings, and Navy experience, were reviewed and evaluated. Each source was reviewed for its applicability to nuclear power plant fire PRAs and the overall quality of the source, The search criteria were: "quality of the data (number of success and failures reported, old vs. current, etc.), types of data (actual fire events vs. test data), completeness (whole suppression system, including detection , vs. suppression only), and industry practices (nuclear plant experience vs. other industry practice)." Each set of data was reviewed against these criteria and the overall quality of the data evaluated. The sources judged to be of highest quality for each suppression system type are identified in NSAC-179L.
One insight that is reported by NFPA and was found to be reflected in the EPRI Fire Event Data Base (FEDB) is that in the case of wet-pipe system failures, for both nuclear (with a limited data set) and non-nuclear data, the dominant cause of failure is human error. Given the volume of data on wet pipe sprinkler experience compared with other systems, it may be that with more operating history, human error will also be found to be a dominant failure mode for other suppression system types.
NSAC-179L also presents a discussion on the reliability of manual suppression. Included is a brief review of values used in fire PRAs and the manual suppression reliability values obtained using the EPRI FEDB (Ref 3).
In summary, it is stated that "Because it provides a much larger and more contemporary database of fire durations and suppression times, the EPRI FEDB can be used to generate a much more complete and realistic set of manual suppression data."
Overall, NSAC-179L provides a valuable review of available data on the reliability of automatic fire protection systems and provide additional confirmation for the reliability estimates in nuclear power plant fire PRAs using the methodology developed in NUREGKR-4840. However, no information was provided or was available in NSAC-179L relating the reliability of fire protection systems to aging. Although NSAC-179L did not explicitly provide information on FPS aging, some of the data sources referenced in that report -and previously reviewed for this study-did discuss aging, and those insights were separately incorporated into this report.
NFPA FPS Reliability
The NFPA has tracked sprinkler system failure in general commercial applications. In this -context, NFPA defines failure as the failure to suppress or control a fire, rather than as a failure to actuate. Figure 1 and Table 3 sprinkler system has been accepted as the principal fire protection in all types of facilities. In addition, sprinklers are the most common protection system installed in computer rooms, reactor control rooms, electrical equipment rooms, and areas where the principal hazard is from nuclear criticality or radioactive contamination. Installations at DOE facilities have been based more on hazard analyses, comparable industrial experience, and insurance industry data than on actual DOE facility experience. In 1980 a special effort was undertaken to collect as much information concerning sprinkler operations at DOE facilities as possible. As a result, 600 sprinkler-related incidents were compiled and analyzed for this effort.
At DOE facilities, the value of automatic sprinkler systems has been confirmed. The report points out the following facts:
The loss from fire in a sprinklered building is about one-fifth of the loss in an unsprinklered building despite that fact that only facilities with potentially low losses do not have sprinklers.
There has been no loss of life caused by fire in a sprinklered DOE building
The sprinkler system is more than 98% effective in controlling or extinguishing fires.
About one-third of all fires were completely extinguished by a single sprinkler head.
The report also, and maybe more important, discusses the reliability of sprinkler systems.
Specifically, the report states that the last bastion of resistance to sprinkler system installations involves fears about their reliability in general, and water damage in particular. The following observations may be the most important to have been drawn from this study:
The chance of a sprinkler head failing is about one in a million per year.
The chance of any damage to, or from, a sprinkler system is about one per year for every 800 systems; and nearly half the incidents were so slight that the damage to, or from, the system was negligible.
Sprinkler systems are more reliable than non-fire protection water systems (e.g., general plumbing). Both the frequency of losses and the mean dollar loss from sprinkler incidents is about 1/2 of that from other water systems.
On the basis of actual experience, the damage resulting fiom a sprinkler system is less than 1% of the fire damage that will result if the system is not present.
Thorough inspection, test, and maintenance procedures can eliminate most causes of sprinkler failure, in either fire or non-fire situations.
Freezing is the most common cause of all sprinkler system losses, including dry pipe systems.
In 115
The wet pipe system is the most effective and reliable type of system All systems had waterflow alarms. In addition, the majority send an alarm directly to an on-site emergency organization.
Inspection and maintenance of fire protection systems is better than the U.S. average. In addition to the NFPA fire protection standards, some 27 DOE sites have on-site fire and emergency services and nearly all sites that exceed $25 million in replacement value have one or more professional fire protection engineers on staff.
Sprinkler valve controls, including electrical supervision, are probably more extensive and effective at DOE facilities than at average U.S. sprinklered properties.
The average age of DOE sprinklers is probably less than the national average. Only ten of the fires were known to involve old-style (pre-1954) sprinkler heads.
It is also pointed out that while the number of sprinkler events results in less statistical validity than other studies, the experience covers a wide range of installation types and occupancy groups over a considerable number of years. In conclusion, the DOE report states that "the DOE experience is closer to the true performance of sprinkler systems than that reported for the U.S. as a whole and that the Australia -New Zealand experience is closest to the true performance record of automatic sprinkler systems."
The experience documented by DOE should closely mirror that of nuclear power plants, given the similarity of requirements for test and maintenance of FPSs between DOE and the NRC. Also,
given that the non-nuclear industry's testing and maintenance programs are generally less comprehensive than those of the nuclear power industry, one could assume that the reliability for the nuclear industry is at least comparable, if not better. Clearly, this assumption is dependent on the attention and importance given to testing and maintenance at individual nuclear power plants.
The lack of statistically complete FPS failure data and a comprehensive study on FPS reliability at nuclear power plants makes it difficult to make a direct comparison with the non-nuclear industry.
Australia -New Zealand FPS Experience
The Australia -New Zealand data indicate the best performance from all of the data sources considered in this section (DOE, NFPA, nuclear power plant), This is attributed to the weekly inspection testing frequency required in Australia and New Zealand. NFPA requirements, as in Section 1-6.1 of NFPA 13A "Inspection, Testing and Maintenance of Sprinkler Systems," states:
"The level of reliability of the protection offered by an automatic sprinkler system is promoted when there is a qualified inspection service. Qualified inspection service should include:
(a) Four visits per year, at regular intervals.
(b) All services indicated in summary Table 7-3 [Table 5 of this report].
(c) The completion of a report form with copies furnished to the property owner."
The difference in automatic suppression system reliability between NFPA and Australia -New Zealand data (95% vs. 99.1 %) can, in part, be attributed to the frequency of rigorous inspection and testing in Australia and New Zedand.
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT FIRE PROTECTION GUIDELINES

NRC Requirements
The requirements for fire protection are defined in 10 CFR 50.48, which references Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 and Branch Technical Position, CMEB, 9.5-1, "Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants." Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 establishes fire protection features required to satisfy Criterion 3 (Fire Protection) of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50. BTP 9.5.1 provides guidelines acceptable to the NRC staff for implementing General Design Criterion 3 (Appendix of 10 CFR 50). These guidelines include acceptance criteria listed in a number of documents, including Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 and 10 CFR 50.48, The purpose of the fire protection is to ensure the capability of shutting down the reactor, maintaining it in a safe shutdown condition, and minimizing radioactive releases to the environment in the event of a fire. Throughout BTP 9.5.1, references to NFPA standards are given as recommended guidance or required compliance. The following section presents a brief overview of the NFPA standards and specifically maintenance requirements.
National Fire Protection Association Guidance
NFPA defines maintenance as " Repair service, including periodically recurrent inspection and tests, required to keep the protective signaling system and its component parts in an operative condition at all times, together with replacement of the system or of its components when, for any reason, they become undependable or inoperative." A key piece of this definition is "with replacement of the system or of its components when, for any reason, they become undependable or inoperative. " It can and has happened that a component has tested satisfactorily and a moment after the successfbl test the component entered a degraded mode in which, if it was required for sexvice, would fail. Under this testing approach, such a component would either fail on demand, with potentially risk-significant results, or fail upon its next testing cycle. A fire protection program that includes an aggressive testing and maintenance program satisfying the guidelines presented in the NFPA standards found in Table 4 should minimize the occurrence of FPS failures on demand. standard. The first is to ensure that the pump will start under any and all conditions. Also, if the pump will not start automatically, there are provisions to override protective devices for manual startup. The second objective is that, after the fire pump start up, the circuits and protective fire pump components will continue operation of the pump as long as water is needed to put out the fire, even if the pump runs itself to destruction. The third objective is to ensure that the installation of the pump is as safe as possible. To that end, fire pump controllers must be listed (certified) for such service.
-
The above standards provide a framework for a successful fire protection program. However, the NFPA standards alone are not enough to ensure that in the event of a fire the capability to shut down the reactor, maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, and minimize radioactive releases to the environment is present. Nuclear power plants must have a comprehensive fire protection program which begins with FPS design and ends with an aggressive inspection, testing, and maintenance program. This performance measurement should be built into the FPS component to allow the condition to be assessed at a glance. Any performance decrement would be noted and diagnostics initiated to determine the cause.
Conclusions
The experience base shows that most nuclear power plants have an aggressive maintenance and testing program and are finding degraded FPS components before a failure occurs. However, the database also shows that there are going to be age-related failures of FPS components. The question is whether such failures will pose significant risk. The impact of these failures can vary.
For example, if a smoke detector actuates and cannot be reset because of increased sensitivity caused by aging, a fire detection signal could be masked by the failed detector. This could result in, at a minimum, a delay in the response to a fire. Also, the plugging of FPS nozzles by rust and scale buildup could prevent the automatic extinguishment of a fire and require manual fire-fighting efforts. However, it is important to note that the plugging of the nozzles did not, in any case, involve 100% blockage; therefore there was partial FPS coverage.
The discovery or occurrence of most of the significant FPS failures during testing and maintenance activities and not on demand demonstrates the existence of an aggressive testing and maintenance program at most nuclear power plants. 
